

ST GEORGE'S HOUSE



Annual Review 2016-17

nurturing wisdom

ST GEORGE'S HOUSE

CONTENTS

- 1 Foreword
- 2 The Warden's Report
- 4 *Justice Without Ethics: A Twentieth Century Innovation?*
Given by Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve CH CBE FBA
- 12 Programme Report 2016 - 17
- 16 Trustees Report
- 18 Financial Statement
- 20 Council Membership
- 21 Corporate Associates

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FOREWORD

by The Right Reverend David Conner KCVO

Dean of Windsor



Photographs: David Clare

Writing a brief Foreword to the St George's House Annual Review each year provides me with a welcome opportunity to congratulate the Warden, the Programme Director and all members of staff at the House on what they have achieved.

This year is certainly no exception. Reading through the Warden's Report and the summary of the Consultation Programme for 2016-17 has been for me a thoroughly encouraging and inspiring experience. I am as convinced as ever that the House is in excellent shape, and that its contribution to the world around us remains deeply significant.

The Warden writes in respect of those who participate in our consultations: "We ask them to take whatever wisdom has been nurtured during those consultations back into their day-to-day world and put it to the service of society." It is for the application to the 'day-to-day' of what has been learnt that we hope. In ways that are usually undramatic, and indeed very often unacknowledged, a certain influence can be brought to bear; a tone can be set that contributes to the enriching and flourishing of the different situations that form the contexts of our lives and work. Happily, over the years, we have received sufficient 'feed-back' from alumni of the House to make us confident that this can be the case.

Recent developments and initiatives in the leadership programme, in our work with clergy, and in the provision of lectures and cultural events have all demonstrated that St George's House, as it moves into its sixth decade, is a robust and vibrant institution. I think we can be certain that its future is secure.

Of course, all who work at St George's House are to be thanked for what they contribute to the present buoyancy of the place. Quite clearly, members of the team are working happily together. There is an atmosphere of mutual respect and genuinely purposeful collaboration; something that people who are guests never fail to notice. In a sense, even before a consultation starts, the place is a model of possibilities.

Others to be thanked of course are the Fellows of the House, members of the Board and members of the Council. We are more than fortunate in having the involvement, support and guidance of some distinguished friends; they somehow manage to squeeze out of their busy lives a good deal of precious time as a gift to St George's House.

Finally, I am pleased to thank all you who read this Annual Review for your continuing commitment. It means a lot to us.



The Warden's Report

St George's House has a long tradition of encouraging and developing leadership. Our consultation programme, for example, motivates participants to lead thinking across a wide range of topics.

We ask them to take whatever wisdom has been nurtured during those consultations back into their day-to-day world and put it to the service of society. But the year under review has taken our commitment to leadership a step further with the establishment of the Society of Leadership Fellows. We hope to recruit two hundred and fifty members to the Society, paying particular attention to gender balance and diversity. Our aim is to build a community of leaders, nurtured by the House, who will then nurture each other on their leadership journeys.

Elsewhere in this Annual Review of the year 2016-17 you will find a summary of the consultation programme. As ever, we have tried to ensure as broad a range of topics as possible, reflecting the issues pertinent to contemporary society. In last year's Warden's Report I mentioned our ambition to increase the number of Clergy Courses from two per year to three in response to demand. I am pleased to report that we have now set that in place.

It is important to acknowledge that a great deal of the work of the House involves partnerships with a number of other organisations. We continue to work with the Corsham Institute, the Senior Faith Leadership Programme, the Jubilee Centre of Birmingham University, Relate, the Department for Communities and Local Government, and the Jane Goodall Institute. We were equally delighted to establish a new partnership with the Ariane de Rothschild Fellowship and are grateful to all these organisations for their underpinning of the ethos of the House, their intellectual input, and often their financial support.

Each year brings to the House a number of external organisations, many of them regular visitors, whose work is in keeping with our overall ethos and purpose. Numbered among them are Windsor Leadership,

Thames Valley Chamber of Commerce, the Windsor Energy Group, Christian Responsibility in Public Affairs, the International Council for Caring Communities, the Gordon Cook Conversations, and the Annual Windsor Leadership Dialogue. They are most welcome.

The year also saw the culmination of our partnership with the Centre for Theological Inquiry (CTI) at Princeton. Our two organisations remain in close contact and we look forward to welcoming CTI back to St George's House should the opportunity arise.

In September 2016 Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller LG DCB delivered the Elson Ethics Lecture on the topic, *Ethics and Intelligence*. The lecture offered a forthright analysis of the intersection between ethical practice and security demands. A lively question and answer session led by broadcaster Martin Stanford greatly added to the evening and we are as ever indebted to Ambassador Edward Elson whose generosity ensures that this yearly autumn lecture goes from strength to strength.

The 2017 St George's House Annual Lecture was given in June by Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve who took as her theme, *Justice without Ethics: A Twentieth Century Innovation?* A packed Chapel heard one of the great philosophers of our time at her intellectual best.

I am pleased to report that our Cultural Programme continues to flourish. You will recall that once a term, we host events in the Vicars' Hall which are open to the broader College community and their guests. The year saw a performance in October by our very own Queen's Six, followed in February by award-winning young pianist Alexander Soares who delighted the audience with a programme of Mozart, Liszt, and Chopin. May saw a visit to the Vicars' Hall by novelist Joanna Trollope who gave a



ST GEORGE'S HOUSE ANNUAL LECTURE 2018

Britain and America: The Lessons of History

Sir Christopher Meyer, KCMG

Thursday **14 June 2018** at 6.30pm

St George's Chapel, Windsor Castle



Sir Christopher Meyer spent almost forty years in the British Diplomatic Service. His career culminated as Ambassador to the United States during the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies between 1997 and 2003.

His five-and-a-half years in Washington, which made him the longest-serving Ambassador to the USA since the Second World War, coincided with 9/11, the wars in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and

Afghanistan, and the preparation for war in Iraq.

Before then he was Ambassador to Germany and had postings to the former Soviet Union, Spain and the European Union in Brussels. He was also Press Secretary to Prime Minister Sir John Major, Press Secretary to Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey, later Lord, Howe, and speech writer to three Foreign Secretaries, James Callaghan, Anthony Crosland and David Owen.

Sir Christopher was knighted by Her Majesty The Queen in 1998.

After his retirement from the Diplomatic Service in 2003, Sir Christopher chaired the Press Complaints Commission for six years until March 2009.

Sir Christopher is now a regular television, radio and newspaper commentator on international affairs and the media.

If Associates have not yet requested tickets to attend the 2018 Annual Lecture please contact us by email at house@stgeorghouse.org or 01753 848848.

terrific talk on Jane Austen and her own reworking of the Austen novel *Sense and Sensibility*.

With regard to St George's House staff and governance, the year saw a number of changes. Susan Suchodolska left the House in December 2016. We wish her well. Rebecca Fry joined us as a Consultation Co-ordinator in March 2017. Her Grace The Duchess of Abercorn resigned from the Council in September 2016. We thank her for the significant contribution she made to our work. Mr David Stern and Mr David Darsch joined the Board in November 2016 & July 2017 respectively, and Mr Colin Oakley retired as Honorary Administrator in October 2016. Our gratitude and best wishes go to Colin and his wife Karin. Our House Manager, Catherine Pryer, became Mrs Catherine Morgan in August 2017. We wish her and her husband Lee every happiness. Warden's Administrator Jenna Tyer gave birth to a daughter, Isabella, in April 2017. Congratulations to her and to her husband Alex.

Let me draw to a close by offering once again my gratitude to all those members of the College community and beyond whose generosity of time, expertise and often financial support greatly assist us in our endeavours. Our Council, Board, and Fellows are a source of invaluable counsel and commitment while the assistance we receive in so many ways from members of the College community greatly enhances the House's position as a constituent part of the College of St George.

I do hope these pages will present a picture of St George's House busily honouring its purpose, to nurture wisdom through dialogue. Thank you for your continuing interest in all that we do.

The Reverend Canon Dr Hueston Finlay
Warden, St George's House





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JUSTICE WITHOUT ETHICS: A TWENTIETH CENTURY INNOVATION? GIVEN BY BARONESS O'NEILL OF BENGARVE CH CBE FBA

For many centuries, discussions of justice and ethics were very closely linked in European thought and culture, but I think, and I hope this evening to suggest to you, that they've now diverged in marked, interesting and quite unsettling ways.

European traditions have seen these discussions as offering distinct but deeply linked answers to the classical question: What ought we do? Duties of justice were seen as setting requirements on states, on other powerful institutions and on individuals, which we intended to structure the public domain, typically by their incorporation into law, and by use of legal sanctions. Ethical duties also set requirements for some institutions and for individuals, but these were to be secured by individual or cultural efforts rather than by law and sanctions. Yet, by the start of the 21st century, claims that justice and ethics were complementary and linked domains of duty, although that is deeply embedded still in European languages and culture, were very often questioned, ignored, even sometimes explicitly rejected.

Today I think it's widely assumed that while standards of justice have universal scope and high importance for all societies, ethical standards, or you may say other ethical standards, do not have universal scope. In many views they're seen either as a private or an individual matter, or a matter of the views of some specific community or culture. In either case, without wider normative importance, principles of justice, in particular of those now seen as setting human rights standards, are seen as setting universal standards that should shape law and regulation and thereby institutional and individual action in all jurisdictions. But ethical principles are widely thought of as anchored in specific cultures or individual choices or preferences, and as lacking wider scope or justification. These, I think, we can all agree are momentous changes, and it's not immediately obvious either why or how they've come about. I'm going to begin with some very sketchy reminders

of past views of duty, and of some of the changes that have led so many people to see justice, often identified with human rights standards, as fundamental and universal, to be embodied and enforced by law, but ethical standards as the creatures of specific cultures or individual choice and preference.

I'm going to suggest that some reasons for this divergence between the justifications proposed for duties of justice and for ethical duties can be understood, and then I'm going to ask how complete and convincing the separation is, and whether justice can be realised without taking ethical duties and their justification seriously once again. Let me do some very sketchy intellectual history, and I'm not an intellectual historian. This is quite naughty of the philosopher to trespass in this way but I think it helped me to understand what's going on. Both philosophical and popular conceptions of justice and ethics have traditionally centred on duties. In Europe, duties were central to normative debate since antiquity. Think of Cicero. They had shaped religious, philosophical and popular discussions of how institutions should be shaped and how lives should be lived. Rights, if they were discussed, were seen either as special rights created by particular transactions, or as general rights that were corollaries of certain so-called 'perfect' or 'complete' duties that specified who had a right and could claim performance of that duty.

But ethical duties, for example duties of beneficence, loyalty or courage, were seen as imperfect, meaning just incomplete duties, because they were seen as duties that didn't have counterpart rights. Many people thought of them traditionally as duties of virtue, because respect for them depended on character and culture rather than on compliance with enforceable requirements. Given that

duties do not have to be matched by counterpart rights, normative reasoning that focuses on duties can, in principle, give us a much wider perspective than can be reached by taking rights as fundamental. For if rights are taken as fundamental, no account can be given of any duties that lack counterpart rights.

So I'm going to talk a little bit now about the decline of duty. What happened? Where did it go? Where, and how, did it disappear? Both philosophical and popular conceptions of justice and ethics were traditionally centred on duties. In Europe, they've been central since antiquity and shaped everything else. But given that they don't have to be matched by counterpart rights, normative reasoning that focuses on duties could in principle offer us a wider perspective. For if rights are taken as fundamental, no account can be given of those duties that lack counterpart rights. They are going to be invisible.

Now, this is not always obvious and as you will know, many contemporary advocates of human rights claim that their approach extends or strengthens, rather than restricts, older accounts of what ought to be done to secure justice. But while treating rights as foundational might support stronger claims about sanctions, and about enforcement, than reasoning that treats duties as basic can support, the scope of rights claims will usually be narrower and cannot be broader than that of claims about duty. In the main, this huge change in views about duty took place in the 20th century, but there were earlier signs of unease. Duty was still preeminent in discussions of what ought to be done at the start of the 19th century, when it remained centre stage across the spectrum from Immanuel Kant's late *Practical Philosophy*, to William Wordsworth's 1805 '*Ode to Duty*' which confidently equates duty with divine demand.

These will be very familiar lines to many of you: 'Stern Daughter of the Voice of God! / O Duty! If that name thou love / Who art a light to guide, a rod / To check the erring, and reprove; / Thou, who art victory and law / When empty terrors overawe; / From vain temptations dost set free; / And calm'st the weary strife of frail humanity!'

But by the middle of the 19th century claims of duty evoked occasional patchy unease. And sometimes even some hostility. Some people felt the undermining of moral certainties and clarities. But there were others who were positively eager to see duty downgraded. Fear, I think, is evident in Matthew Arnold's wistful sadness about the waning of Christian faith and the ebbing of duty. Here's Arnold:

'The Sea of Faith / Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore / Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled. / But now I only hear / Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar, / Retreating, to the breath / Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear / And naked shingles of the world. / Ah, love, let us be true / To one another! for the world, which seems / To lie before us like a land of dreams, / So various, so beautiful, so new, / Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light, / Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain; / And we are here as on a darkling plain / Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, / Where ignorant armies clash by night.'

Wistful, but not hostile. Less than 30 years later, however, Friedrich Nietzsche claimed that there was nothing but gain in doing without duty. He wrote this: 'What destroys a man more quickly than to work, think and feel without inner necessity, without any deep personal desire, without pleasure - as a mere automaton of duty?' Although their attitudes to the decline of duty are far apart, both Arnold and Nietzsche see the alternative, it seems, as an

increasing emphasis on personal and subjective standards and concerns. In this I think they were prophetic. Claims that personal and subjective choices are the successors to the claims of duty once you get beyond the domain of justice, gained increasing prominence in the 20th century. Indeed, at the very start of the 20th century, GE Moore's *Principia Ethica* ends with a surprisingly influential chapter that endorses a wholly privatised vision of ethics, centred on individual experiences of beauty, pleasure, friendship and knowledge, but no longer on families, institutions, communities, nations or their action, and least of all on duty.

However, the decline of duty was uneven. The slow retreat of support for duty among intellectuals and poets didn't undermine the ethics of duty in day-to-day life. Indeed, as I read it, certain appeals to duty gained new prominence during the first war when they took the form of widespread, sometimes enthusiastic, insistence that you ought to do your duty, which is above all to serve, and even to kill or be killed for, your country. Of course, most who took that view saw duty to King, or Kaiser, and country as the public face of duty, to be honoured alongside duties to God, to family and friends, to neighbours and to the poor. Yet a belief that patriotic duty had distinctive, even overriding, importance became briefly and wildly popular. I find it very sobering to remember the fervour with which the outbreak of war in 1914 was greeted, and how widely killing for a patriotic cause was seen as a matter of duty, even of noble duty. Some even represented, or you may think misrepresented, patriotic duty as an ethic of sacrifice. Those killed in conflict were seen as making the ultimate sacrifice, even if they were conscripts who did not choose their fates.

The idea that being killed for a cause and killing for a cause were forms of



noble so-called 'blood sacrifice', was very widely discussed at the beginning of the last century. Some supporters of the Easter 1916 Rising against British rule in Ireland described those who lost their lives in attacks that they had initiated as martyrs. This terminology is still popular in some quarters, particularly at present in the rhetoric of the so-called Islamic State. Classically, of course, martyrs defend a noble or principled cause and then are killed by others for doing so. Something quite different is going on when those who kill themselves for a cause, for example hunger strikers, or kill others who are no threat to them, for example suicide bombers, are called martyrs. This, it seems to me, is evidence of an ethical tradition falling into disarray.

That exaggerated emphasis on patriotic duty of the early years of World War One was not universally shared, and it was indeed explicitly rejected by some who were close to, and sympathetic to, the cause of Irish independence. For example, WB Yeats explicitly rejects it in his wartime poem '*An Irish Airman Foresees His Death*', which contrasts patriotic duty with personal choice. Here's Yeats:

'I know that I shall meet my fate, /
Somewhere among the clouds above; /
Those that I fight I do not hate, / Those
that I guard I do not love; / My country
is Kiltartan Cross, / My countrymen
Kiltartan's poor, / No likely end could
bring them loss / Or leave them happier
than before. / Nor law, nor duty bade

me fight, / Nor public men, nor cheering
crowds, / A lonely impulse of delight
/ Drove to this tumult in the clouds; / I
balanced all, brought all to mind, / The
years to come seemed waste of breath,
/ A waste of breath the years behind /
In balance with this life, this death.'

Of course, the crowds who cheered in 1914 felt otherwise, but unsurprisingly enthusiasm for patriotic duty waned as the war proved more catastrophically brutal and destructive than had been expected, or even imagined. Hostility to the narrow conception of public duty as patriotism in wartime mounted. It became, as we all know, a leading theme of the poetry of the first war, and it animates EM Forster's much quoted aphorism from the 1930s, 'If I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country'. The thought that personal loyalties are more important than patriotic duty resonated and spread, and criticism of patriotic duty expanded into wider questioning and criticism of all duties.

But this was not, by any means, the end of the story. Between the two wars, initially only in rather limited academic circles, a much more systematic retreat from duty gained ground. The startling success in the 1930s of logical positivism, with its uncompromising insistence that only empirically verifiable and analytical claims are meaningful, and that ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics and theology should all consequently be rejected as literally meaningless, had to reject both duties of justice and ethical duties. Logical positivism, as I'm sure you all know, did not offer convincing arguments for these claims, and those it did offer were rather soon questioned, rejected or dismissed. Nevertheless, its influence spread from narrow philosophical circles in Berlin and Vienna, partly because so many of its early exponents were driven into exile across the world. But while logical

positivism failed to show that claims about justice and ethics were literally meaningless, it did succeed in spreading widespread scepticism about their justification.

Doing without an account of duty, however, has costs, high costs. In the face of the further catastrophes of the Second World War, it was widely agreed that standards mattered, especially for the public domain. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by member states of the United Nations in the late 40s, and signalled a wide commitment to a certain range of supposedly universal standards of justice. But it differed from older accounts of justice in three ways. Indeed, it was weaker in three ways. First, it addressed justice from the recipient's, rather than the agent's, perspective by setting out a list of human rights which would require others to carry the counterpart duties. Second, it was silent about ethical duties and third, it was on the whole justified by appeals to authority.

The last of these differences is surely significant. Appeals to declarations or conventions, or other legal instruments such as constitutions, treaties or statutes, are also appeals to authority, and they can offer convincing justifications only to those who accept the authority to which appeal is made. While the post-World War Two affirmation of human rights does not endorse logical positivism, it frequently relies on arguments for authority and thereby on various forms of legal positivism. Those who hope to justify human rights by appealing to authority ignore the methodological claims, the flamboyant claims of those logical positivists, but they too marginalise or reject demands for deeper justification. Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the slightly later European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe 1950 - by the way

drafted by someone who later became Conservative Lord Chancellor - these assumed that if the relevant instruments are endorsed by a state agreement and ratification, that's going to secure their authority.

While many who stress the authoritative backing of human rights agree that appeals to authority aren't quite enough, and that human rights also really need moral justification, the justifications that are generally offered are, let's say, skimpy and they often take it for granted that the rights that are in the canonical declarations and charters will be what gets justified. Contemporary life, I suggest, remains very deeply influenced by versions of legal positivism, and it frequently avoids or evades questions about deeper justifications of the standards proclaimed. Parenthetically, however, I suspect that legal positivism isn't nearly as popular or widespread as appeals to arguments from authority in support of human rights might suggest to us. Despite uncertainties about deeper justification, lots of people who set stall by human rights international law, or by the rule of law, even by more detailed regulations of accountability, probably think that better justifications can be provided, that wider ethical backing for human rights standards is available. It's just, so to speak, that for everyday purposes they seemingly find it variously necessary, adequate or perhaps merely convenient, to appeal to authority and ignore those deeper demands.

In the end, the ancient alliance between ethics and political philosophy was, I think, not undermined by the inadequacy of justificatory arguments, but rather by the emergence of totalitarian regimes and the vast human and moral costs of their policies. Those same realities made it pretty obvious that consigning justice and ethics to the dustbin of history had been a pretty bad

plan. But what emerged after World War Two was, after all, not a revised or improved version of the ethics of duty. If anything, appeals to duty became yet more suspect because they were repeatedly misappropriated to cloak official misdeeds under totalitarian regimes, from Eichmann to the Stasi so to speak. Morally rebarbative action by state officials was all too often mischaracterised and wrongly dignified by claiming that it was a matter of duty, 'I was only doing my duty'.

Can the human rights declarations carry the weight that we have sought to put on them in the last 70 years? It looks superficially as though they might at least reinstate an account of duties of justice, moreover one that's nicely shorn of metaphysical and theological presuppositions, and perhaps can rise above official misappropriation. But the reality, I think, is less clear and more troubling in several ways. I list some obvious difficulties which arise when we seek to detach an account of justice from deeper justification, and from a wider account of ethical duties.

The first problem is that declarations and conventions simply aren't in the business of deeper justification. Of course, an appeal to authority means that human rights can be supported in many, but not all, contexts by pointing to the various instruments, and of the fact that some, although not all, states have ratified them. The downside is that these positive justifications can't provide reasons for states that don't accept the claims of the relevant authorities to start doing so. Appeals to authority, we know, may fall on deaf ears, and they may offer little reason for states to sign up to human rights instruments or to abide by them.

Secondly, the rights proclaimed in 1948 were not linked to any adequate account of the allocation of the necessary counterpart duties to

competent agents. That is relatively unproblematic, where those counterpart duties must be held by everybody. For example, rights not to be coerced or not to be killed must be supported by duties that are held by all. However other duties, including duties that support liberty and rights such as duties to enforce or protect those rights, have to be held by specified agents or agencies, not by everyone. And duties to realise social and economic rights have to be allocated to identifiable and competent agents, if it's to be clear who ought to do what, for whom. Proclaiming rights without specifying the necessary counterpart duties and duty bearers leaves it obscure who ought to do what for whom.

The drafting of the Universal Declaration had gestured, a bit confusedly, variously to nations, countries and peoples. But these all lack the integrated capacities for action and decision-making that are needed for agency. They cannot carry the complex duties to respect and realise the proclaimed rights. It's perhaps no wonder that a generation ago many people complained that the rights in the Universal Declaration were just manifesto rights of no adequate clear practical import. The criticisms were addressed, up to a point, by two United Nation Covenants of the 60s. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which explicitly and specifically assign certain duties to states that ratify these instruments. However, a careful look at the covenants shows that they don't in fact assign the duties that have to be met to secure the rights to the states, rather what they assign to the states are second order duties to allocate and enforce some arrangement of duties that will secure respect for the rights in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and will support the realisation of the rights in

the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

Listen to these words from the latter covenant: 'Each state party to the present covenant undertakes to take steps individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present covenant by all appropriate means, particularly the adoption of legislative measures'. Achieving progressively the full realisation of rights by all appropriate means is a matter of ensuring that unspecified others, individuals and institutions that are not identified, that may not or not yet exist, making sure that they discharge the complex duties needed to secure these rights. It requires states to construct institutions and to delegate tasks in order to secure one or perhaps another effective allocation of duties.

Whereas traditional discussions of duties of justice had focused on human duties to others, the discourse of human rights is notably more indirect. It focuses on second order duties to bring about some allocation of first order duties which, if it was observed, would secure the human rights that have been proclaimed. An advance, I suggest, but not quite what it's billed as. Was it a good idea to assign these complex second order duties to states? One answer might be, it was a jolly good idea, at least at the time because states alone had powers sufficient to secure respect for, and realisation of, rights. A second, more pessimistic answer might be that assigning the task of ensuring that everyone and all institutions respect and realise rights to the most powerful institutions, to states, is very problematic. It's rather like assigning the supervision of hen houses to foxes, a parallel of course illustrated by the



fact that a large number of states have indeed been major and persistent violators of human rights.

A third answer might be that the allocation of duties which were the covenant's aim is simply obsolescent. 1966, if we look back just over half a century ago, was a high watermark of state power. The western colonial empires were being dismantled, a Westphalian world of independent states seemed to be emerging. Both old and new states were taken to have, and quite often had, well-defined boundaries, and some of them could exercise power effectively within these boundaries. Since then, however, globalisation has been transforming and reconfiguring power in ways that often make securing respect for, and realisation of, rights harder for states. Our world includes not merely a range of rogue states and failed states, but will not or cannot secure or respect rights for their inhabitants. But it is a world of porous borders in which many states find their powers are not adequate, and that they are constrained by a variety of very powerful non-state actors.

These fundamental changes suggest to me that it may now be less feasible for states that are party to international instruments to be the pivotal bearers

of second order duties, to ensure that everyone respects and helps to realise all rights.

The declarations are unavoidably simply silent about duties without counterpart rights. They're silent about ethical duties, and it's far from clear that duties of justice, including those that are the counterparts of human rights and standards, can be implemented if we neglect ethical duties. Duties, for example, of honesty or decency might be important for the effective realisation of justice. It's far from clear that treating rights rather than duties as fundamental can leave either justice or ethics unchanged. The cultural costs of prioritising recipients over action and rights over duties is, I think, high. And it prioritises a view of human beings as claimants or victims, and it may give undue prominence to passive and reactive responses such as resentment, rancour and blame. Very popular today. I'll return in a moment to consider whether justice can do without ethics.

I need to say a very little, or the argument will be deceptive, about the question of deeper justification. The contemporary landscape, I think, has some encouraging features, through some attempts at deeper justifications of principles of justice. In the early post-war period, many still assumed that logical positivism had undermined justice as well as ethical duties, and it was widely said that political philosophy was dead. It is no longer the case; it has flourished since the 1970s. Theories of justice, beginning with those proposed by John Rawls, Robert Nozick and Jürgen Habermas, have been extended and elaborated on by many. They aim to offer a justification of standards of justice and they don't rely on arguments from authority. Yet, while the vast body of contemporary writing in political philosophy seeks deeper justification, and while it has often emphasised

principles of distributive justice which the human rights approaches are less comfortable with, it often ignores ethical questions. The thought that we can provide deep, or at least deeper, reasons for justice, but not for other ethical principles was, for example, central to John Rawls' later work.

Whereas in his earlier theory of justice he had thought that justification should be of certain ethical principles as well as justice, his late work, particularly the book *Political Liberalism*, rejects all versions of what he calls 'comprehensive liberalism', that is liberalism that argues for ethical as well as political duties, in favour of a position that he calls, it's an odd phrase, 'political liberalism', which is silent and deliberately silent about ethical duties. A similar focus on justice without close links to ethics can be found in other leading writers. Habermas explicitly anchors justificatory arguments in the possibility of agreement reached via political discourse from which nobody is excluded. Nozick's libertarian arguments support a maximal private sphere in which individuals' choices and preferences are seen as decisive. And neoclassical economics has argued from similar assumptions. Much of the revived political philosophy of the last half century has left ethical duties and their justification firmly out of scope.

Let me turn now to the justification of ethical principles. The thought that justification can support political but not ethical standards fits quite well with some aspects of traditional liberal ideals. Liberal thinking has always stressed the importance of protecting individual choice. But much as this matters, it surely cannot be the whole story. Nobody thinks that it does not matter, what individuals choose, or that every choice should be protected. Yet if deeper justifications support only an account of justice, the only choices

that their adherents will find reason to criticise, sanction or forbid, will be those that reach a requirement of justice, for example, by violating others' rights. That's a much-treasured conclusion in certain writing.

It seems to me implausible to think that a convincing account of justice can be indifferent to everything that is not unjust. More is surely at stake and some choices are better than others. These issues are, I think, often obscured by a promiscuous use of the term 'value' to refer to whatever individuals happen to choose or prefer. This, I think, leaves it fatally obscure whether empirical or normative claims are at stake. Where empirical claims are made about individuals' choices or preferences, there's going to be no general reason to see anything, let alone everything that's chosen or preferred by some agents or some cultures, as valuable. Much that is chosen or preferred may be worthless or bad. Some individuals in some cultures choose self-enrichment or sadistic treatment of others. That doesn't show that self-enrichment and sadism are values, and the fact that some people in some cultures admire, pursue and prefer them does not, I suggest, make them into values.

Referring to whatever individuals happen to choose as values confuses empirical claims about individuals' preferences with normative claims about what's valuable. It conflates empirical with ethical claims. Referring to whatever societies happen to admire or pursue as values, confuses empirical claims about social attitudes with normative claims about what is valuable. Once again it conflates empirical with ethical claims. Parenthetically, if we admire British values it is because of the values they are, not because of them happening to be British. Three snapshot illustrations of these confusions will have to suffice.

First, the fetishism about individual autonomy variously conceived, and very different from Kant's conception of autonomy I hasten to add. It's widely said to be a terribly important value. Yet individual autonomy can be used to adopt odious, as well as admirable, principles and decisions, and it's far from clear why it should count as a value at all if we can't offer any account of what makes some choices valuable. Second, appeals to individuals' choices and preferences are, of course, central to a lot of economic theory and to many consumerist ideologies. But if individuals' actual preferences are automatically deemed values, a covert and unsupported normative claim has been advanced. Promoting preferences by calling them values simply misleads. I think I will leave the third issue aside, that suggests the two I've given you show us that what is often on offer is not a justification of values, but a devaluation of values.

So, to the question: Can we have justice without ethics? Those who think that ethical standards are a matter of individual choice or shared attitudes often conclude that aiming for justice is enough, and that the public domain need take no account of any other standards or of their justification. This view, I'm going to suggest, is not consistent with taking justice seriously. Working out how to realise justice requires us to take a view not only of standards of justice, but also of certain ethical standards that are needed for realising justice, and therefore of the justification of those ethical standards. It's widely assumed that duties of justice, and their counterpart rights, can be secured and realised simply by having just constitutions and laws, and complying with and enforcing their requirements. But while requirements of justice limit and constrain just action, at best they offer indeterminate guidance and not complete instructions

for action. Even when legal instruments are reinforced with specific regulations, more guidance demanding forms of accountability, these proliferating rules can never fully eliminate indeterminacy. They cannot specify exactly what must be done and not done, if justice is to be respected or realised.

Providing more and more explicit procedures and deploying and applying rules has of course its place, particularly in the procedures of courts and tribunals of arbitration and administration. Doing so can help established authorities decide how to proceed, they can show whether a decision was reached by a duly constituted authority using appropriate procedures. But these justifications are limited. They can show whether due process was followed, but not whether decisions made or action undertaken were ethically acceptable, let alone optimal, in actual cases. Principles of justice, like all principles of action, are indeterminate, and indeterminacy, as has often been said, goes all the way down. This point is neither new nor trivial. Aristotle, Kant and Wittgenstein - and you can't have a much heftier trio - all pointed out that rules of all sorts, principles, standards, guidelines, regulations, are intrinsically incomplete and that indeterminacy can't be eliminated by adding more rules, more requirements, more regulations or more guidance. I think there are certain institutions that might think about that.

There's no way of extending the paraphernalia of institutional life that is going to fix sharp boundaries between compliance and infraction for every situation. Trying to offer complete rules, instructions or guidance is, I think, in principle, impossible, not to mention daunting and depressing for those who are meant to live up to them, who may conclude that even compliance demands too much, and may end up ignoring, flouting or gaming the

prolix rules they encounter. Practical judgement is needed to shape action, to fit standards of justice in particular contexts and there can be no complete methods, that is to say no algorithms, for practical judgement.

Practical judgement is a matter of combining a clear sense of standards for what may and ought to be done, that is to say the plurality of rules and standards that must be respected, with a grasp of a range of further considerations that bear on actual cases. In living up to standards of justice, we may need to take account not only of those standards but of the feasibility, the consequences, the affordability and the ethical acceptability of specific ways of implementing, or living up to those standards.

Doing so cannot be done simply by relying on hunch, or individual preference, or subjective choice, or simply invoking widely accepted standards. Nor can freedom of expression provide an adequate discipline for identifying or assessing standards of action. Freedom of expression is indeed necessary for agents to encounter other views and arguments, including ones that challenge their current beliefs and attitudes. But it is not sufficient to ensure systematic or effective consideration of established beliefs

and attitudes, or to expose them to searching check and challenge. Reliance on Habermasian engagement in social settings that permit participation, or on serendipitous encounters with others, is not going to provide a sufficiently robust discipline for good judgement.

Practical judgement is more likely to be robust if it's formed and informed by encounter and communication with positions that are structured and disciplined, and can bring a diversity of practical and cultural standards and considerations to bear on situations and on action. Practical and cultural disciplines are, I think, the way to provide sustained and informative challenge to received beliefs and attitudes and also to the shaping of actions in ways that respect the requirements of justice, and also the wider range of ethical and practical demands.

Now, I'm not saying that cultures provide algorithms for action, far from it, but at their most effective they can provide a formative discipline for individuals and institutions. Closed, corrupt or enclaved cultures and subcultures often cannot do so. They're more likely to trap thought and action in silos of conformity that insulate received views from check and challenge. Wider and more open cultural processes can, however, avoid this danger by opening

practical, including ethical, judgement to a range of more rigorous forms of check and challenge, adjustment and moderation, and to realistic consideration of the multiple ways in which one might live up to a plurality of standards. They can allow for, they can foster, ways of respecting the requirements not only of justice, but of ethics and of wider cultural, practical and technical requirements.

It follows, I think, that if cultures are needed for enacting justice, the ethical standards embedded in cultures and their justification also matter for justice. Many proponents of justice point out that there are corrupt, destructive, divisive and dishonest cultures. Surely true. But there are cultures that do not face in these ways. I suggest that the insouciant marginalisation of ethical justification that positivist, subjectivist and also communitarian views of ethics, have endorsed, have celebrated, simply overlooks the importance of ethical standards. I do not know entirely how we can move at this point but I conclude that if we think justice matters, we cannot be indifferent to wider ethical standards or to their justification. Thank you very much.



Programme Report 2016-17

The most significant development in the year under review is the advent of the Society of Leadership Fellows whereby the House has embarked on its own discrete leadership development programme. Leadership Conversations took part throughout the year, under the guidance of the Leadership Fellows Programme Director. It is a membership initiative and is well on its way to achieving a membership target of 250.

The internal Consultation programme saw a variety of topics covered in the course of the year, usually following a twenty-four hour residential format. The Consultations are devised by the Programme Director, aided by a number of expert parties. Each Consultation involves between 22-30 participants. The programme is funded by a mixture of sponsorship, donations and through the St George's House Consultation Bursary Fund. External organisations sympathetic to the ethos of the House continue to bring their own Consultations, paying to use the facilities. The programme also included two clergy courses, one of ten days duration, the other lasting five days, devised and delivered by the Dean and Canons of Windsor. The year also saw a number of lectures and further events in our ongoing cultural programme. Overall, we meet the objectives of the Charity in providing space and time to explore in depth topics relevant to contemporary society. There follows a more detailed outlay of the programme.

Civil Society and the State – The role of Charities in Campaigning, 5 - 6 September 2016

Since the 2010 General Election in England, there has been a contraction of statutory funding of charities, as public spending has been cut. A number of measures have been introduced to strengthen limits to lobbying by charities. Our Consultation, chaired by Dame Anne Owers and with Board Member Loretta Minghella as a participant, brought together a range of people from civil society, government and beyond to explore the legitimacy of charities in a representative democracy to campaign for change and to challenge government policy.

The Role of Virtue in the Professions 8 - 9 September 2016

Under the aegis of the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, University of Birmingham, this Consultation explored the role of virtue in the professions, including the medical, legal, teaching, nursing, and business professions and the British Army.

The New Testament in Preaching and Ministry 3 - 7 October 2016

This second Clergy Consultation of the year focused on the New Testament, bringing together twenty-six clergy from various Christian denominations and backgrounds who have had at least five years ministerial experience. The aim was to reconnect their pastoral experience to their academic training by examining new lines of scholarship;

reflecting on preaching the New Testament; and thinking through some pastoral issues as they relate to the text. On this occasion two expert external facilitators led the programme, one a Dominican friar based in Oxford, the other a lecturer in theology at Trinity College, Oxford.

Leadership Fellows, From Good to Exceptional 9 - 11 October

This was the first event in the new St George's House Leadership Programme which saw participants working with each other to transform those aspects of their leadership style where they are already strong into exceptional strengths.

The Queen's Six, Cultural Programme 14 October 2016

Continuing our termly series of cultural events in the Vicars' Hall, the Queen's Six performed before a full-house. The ensemble, made up entirely of Lay Clerks, offered a varied programme of music.

Connecting Young People – Healing the Social Divides in Society, 17 - 18 October 2016

While the consultation focused on universities, this consultation in partnership with Virgin Money concentrated on young people generally, taking the Brexit vote as its starting point. Arguably, the surprise outcome has demonstrated how society in the UK has become more fractured than we realise, as a result of increasingly polarised groups essentially talking to themselves to affirm

their own world view. This polarisation can all too easily lead to prejudice, discrimination and, potentially, extremism. The consultation sought to find ways in which the barriers between young people might be broken down.

Freedom of Speech and Universities

31 October - 1 November 2016

Universities are under increasing pressure from government to prevent students coming into contact with 'extreme' ideas. The thesis is that exposure to such ideas risks drawing students into terrorism. But there are other risks also, in particular the risk to freedom of speech and to academic freedom. Many university administrators appear to believe that in order to prevent potential terrorism, the law requires them to curtail the freedom of academic debate. Is this an accurate interpretation of the law or are universities actually in breach of the Education Act (1986) and the Human Rights Act (1998)? What are the overall implications for tertiary education in the UK?

Our Consultation, chaired by Lord MacDonald, was a partnership between the House, the School of Oriental and African Studies and Matrix Chambers. The programme looked in depth at the issues facing universities with regard to freedom of expression and the relationship with the state.

Leadership Fellows, Breaking Bad

5 November 2016

This second event in the Leadership Programme worked with participants to identify their bad practice as leaders and work towards developing effective strategies for leaving such practice behind.

Life Transitions - learning from other sectors to support effective transition from the UK Armed Forces, 7 - 8 November 2016

A follow-up consultation, in partnership with the Forces in Mind Trust, exploring how life transitions are approached, and managed in a range of different situations and settings with the aim of identifying learning that can support a successful life transition in a non-military context. By comparing and contrasting the different approaches and ways of handling significant change the Consultation identified best practice and recommendations which all participants can use in future strategic planning to better support more effective life transitions.

Leadership Fellows, Leading Culture Change

1 - 2 December 2016

The third event in the Leadership Programme explored key aspects of participants' role in leading more effective teams and driving culture change across their organisations.

Senior Faith Leadership Programme

9 - 11 January 2017

The first of three consultations brought a new tranche of emerging leaders from the three Abrahamic faiths to work on mutual understanding through scriptural reasoning.

Leadership Fellows, Leaders as Facilitators

24 - 25 January 2017

This leadership conversation focused on facilitation skills as used by leaders. The intention was to sharpen existing skills and convert weaknesses into strengths. There was also room in the programme for Leadership Fellows to consider whether any of their number would like to assist with the overall facilitation of the leadership conversations.

Pursuing Electoral Reform, 25 - 26 January 2017

This consultation, in partnership with the Electoral Reform Society, focused on electoral reform and the role of the trades unions.

Leadership Fellows, From Good to Exceptional (Part 2), 5 - 7 February 2017

This Conversation followed up the first Leadership Conversation in October 2016. The product from that Conversation provided part of the backdrop to this session. This Conversation aimed to convert existing strengths which enable Fellows to perform pretty well as leaders into exceptional strengths which will enable them to improve their performance significantly.

Alexander Soares, Pianist, Cultural Programme

24 February 2017

Pianist Alexander Soares played a programme of pieces by Mozart, Liszt and Chopin to a full house as part of our cultural programme.

Education: Digital Technology's Role in Enabling Skills Development for a Connected World

6 - 7 March 2017

The first of three consultations in 2017 in partnership with the Corsham Institute. This gathering looked at how technology is increasingly being used to deliver education, knowledge and skills in new and innovative ways. Coupled with future changes to the mode and pattern of work and the economic shock posed by the current political climate, the consultation considered how digital technology can best support individuals to develop the skills needed to attain maximum benefit from its use in work and social situations.

Consultation for Her Majesty's Lord Lieutenants

10 - 12 March 2017

An annual gathering for Lord Lieutenants at the invitation of

the Dean of Windsor. The weekend brings together a mix of experienced and recently appointed Lord Lieutenants to learn more about the role from each other and from specially invited speakers.

Leadership Fellows, The Chair-CEO Relationship – Getting it Right, 15 - 16 March 2017

The start of a new series on Board Leadership. Open to Chairs/ Chairs-Elect and Deputy Chairs of Boards plus Chief Executives/ CEOs-Elect and Deputy CEOs.

Senior Faith Leadership Programme, 20 - 22 March 2017

The second of our three consultations in partnership with the Cambridge Coexist Leadership programme.

Open Science: the citizen's role and contribution to research, 6 - 7 April 2017

The second of three consultations in partnership with the Corsham Institute. Open Science, as a movement, aims to make scientific research, data and the dissemination of findings more accessible to everyone in society, with citizen science forming one dimension of this movement, focusing more specifically on the input from members of the public to research activities. The aim of the consultation was to consider the future vision for citizen science in a more connected society, and how this vision should evolve.

Natural Shapes, Natural Numbers: A St George's House Lecture by Professor Gábor Domokos 7 April 2017

The Gomboc is the first known homogenous object with one stable and one unstable equilibrium point, thus two equilibria altogether on a horizontal surface, invented by Professor Gábor Domokos and Mr. Péter Várkonyi. Professor Domokos gave this lecture to mark the presentation of a Gomboc to St George's House.

Leadership Fellows, Leading Innovation, 2 - 3 May 2017

This conversation explored how best to be a leader of innovation and was co-facilitated by our Leadership Fellow David Bott who has spent many years as a leading thinker and strategist in this field. David is currently Principal Fellow of Warwick Manufacturing Group and was previously Director of Innovation Programmes for the Technology Strategy Board.

Currency: Redefining the way we transact in a digital world, 4 - 5 May 2017

A third consultation in partnership with the Corsham Institute. Digital technology is disrupting traditional models

of transaction, enabling new forms of 'currency' to emerge in support of a wider range of value exchanges, the emergence of 'crypto-currencies' being one such example.

This consultation considered future possibilities for currency in a more digitally connected society, and specifically considered whether crypto-currencies and data will become established as currencies of preference.

An Evening with Joanna Trollope, 5 May 2017

Novelist Joanna Trollope read from and discussed her work on Jane Austen in this latest event in our cultural programme.

Character and Citizenship, 22 - 23 May 2017

The Jubilee Centre conducts work on different aspects of character education. Policy statements have been circulated to policymakers, practitioners and academics across the UK, and have met with widespread support. Given the important interconnections between the two fields, the Consultation drew together expertise from both academics and professionals in practice to assist with developing a Statement on Character Education and Citizenship Education.

Faiths and the Public Sphere, 1 - 2 June 2017

A partnership with the University of Warwick. The original Malvern Conference of 1941, entitled The Life of the Church and the Order of Society, looked at the future of society through the prism of philosophical and theological questioning.

This consultation revisited Malvern for our own age, taking place in the context of a deep sense of fragmentation highlighted by the Brexit vote, but which has deeper and longer roots. As at Malvern, the stability and security of Europe feels directly under threat – not so much from a global war as from a series of destabilising global trends, including terrorism, economic uncertainty and the resurgence of nationalism. The time seemed ripe to develop a deep and critical sense of what it means to be British and European in the 21st century.

Leadership Fellows, Leading a Winning Team, 5 - 6 June 2017

A Masterclass building on an earlier programme and designed for CEOs and Directors looking for new ways of revitalising their leadership of their team.

Supporting Farmers Post-Brexit, 20 - 21 June 2017

UK agriculture will face a range of challenges in the years ahead. While the government has guaranteed the financial status quo until 2020, the sector needs to look beyond that time. What are the potential threats and opportunities

relevant to farmers in the post-Brexit world? How will the transition be managed? The implications go beyond the purely economic outcome of Brexit to include cultural, pastoral and social ramifications to be considered carefully. This was the focus of our consultation.

Nature and Human Nature: The Digital Media Conversation on Science and Society,
29 - 30 June 2017

Our third and final consultation in partnership with the Centre for Theological Inquiry at Princeton. The search for biological life in the cosmos has long been a preoccupation of humankind and is now an established multidisciplinary field of scientific investigation under the name of astrobiology.

Inevitably, much of the media response to this area of research is rich in sensationalism but poor in reasoned, cross-disciplinary analysis. Yet all the while scientists and scholars in the humanities and social sciences have been holding a different conversation on science and society, a much more nuanced, thoughtful and creative conversation. It is this conversation that we sought to develop in June and to consider what might be the role of digital media in making this discourse more widely accessible.

God: Some Conversations, Clergy Consultation,
3 - 13 July 2017

The ten-day clergy consultation combined theological work with a number of presentations and discussion on issues pertinent to society as a whole. These include: America and the World; Freedom of Expression; God and the Arts; Artificial Intelligence; Prisons; Children and Young People; Luther's Theology; and Christianity and Islam. We had a range of expert speakers in place to lead on each issue.

Senior Faith Leadership Programme,
18 - 20 July 2017

The third of our three consultations exploring Faith leadership through scriptural reasoning.

Leadership Fellows, Courage in Leadership,
20 - 21 July 2017

At a time when the external environment is so uncertain, it's easy to argue that leaders need to show more courage. What are the threats in our different worlds that make us feel the need to be more courageous? In these moments, what's holding us back – and when we "go for it", what drives us on? What more might we offer our leadership teams to support them in becoming more courageous? Do we have a

sense of the limits on courageous leadership?

The Ariane de Rothschild Fellowship Programme,
Friday 21st to Saturday 29th July 2017

The Ariane de Rothschild Fellowship harnesses the entrepreneurial drive of mainly Jewish and Muslim social entrepreneurs to build sustainable impact and at the same time develop a new brand of dialogue and leadership. Between twenty and thirty of the Fellows spent a week here on a carefully constructed programme.

Roots and Shoots, 31 July- 5 August 2017

The latest visit to the House by the Jane Goodall Institute brought some thirty representatives of the Roots and Shoots initiative from all over the world to spend a week at the House on organisational and personal leadership development.

LECTURES

The annual Elson Ethics Lecture was given by the Baroness Manningham-Buller LG DCB on the theme, *Ethics and Intelligence*.

This year's St George's House Annual Lecture was given by the Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve who took as her title, *Justice without Ethics: A 21st Century Innovation?*

PUBLIC BENEFIT

The House continues to focus on its charitable objectives with due regard to the public benefit guidance issued by the Charity Commission. Free or subsidised access to consultations is facilitated by investment and voluntary income.

TRUSTEES' REPORT YEAR ENDED 31 AUGUST 2017

St George's House Trust (Windsor Castle) A company limited by guarantee without a share capital.
Registered Company No. 3597496. Registered Charity No. 1071186

The Trustees, who are also the Directors for the purposes of company law, present their annual report together with the audited financial statements for the year ended 31 August 2017.

THE TRUSTEES

The Trustees who served the company during the period were as follows:

The Right Reverend D J Conner KCVO

The Reverend Canon Dr H E Finlay

The Reverend Canon M G Poll

The Reverend Canon Dr M Powell

Admiral Sir J M Burnell-Nugent KCB, CBE

Ms L C R Minghella OBE

Professor H E Montgomery MB, BS, BSc, FRCP, MD, FRGS, FRI, FFICM

Sir M Moody-Stuart KCMG

Mr J L Newbegin

Dame B M Ogilvie AC, DBE, FRS

Dr R D Townsend

Mr R Woods CBE

Sir M Moody-Stuart KCMG resigned as a trustee on 4 March 2017

Mr D Stern was appointed as a trustee on 23 November 2016

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

MENZIES LLP, Chartered Accountants & Statutory Auditor, Lynton House, 7 - 12 Tavistock Square, London WC1H 9LT



STRUCTURE, GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT

St George's House Trust (Windsor Castle) is a charitable company, company number 3597496, and registered charity number 1071186.

Memorandum and Articles of Association, established under the Companies Act 1985, govern the House. New Articles of Association were adopted on 25 November 2013. The company is limited by guarantee without any share capital.

The Board consists of The Dean of Windsor, not more than four Canons of Windsor and at least seven but no more than 10 other Trustees, at least two and not more than four of whom shall be members of the Council of St George's House. The Board meets as required to consider and advise the House on its programme of work. The Board of Trustees appoints the Finance and General Purposes Committee. The number of members of the company is unlimited but every member has to be approved by the Trustees. The Chairman, Board of Trustees and Warden may propose new trustees as required. These proposals are subject to discussion and approval by the Board.

The day to day operations of the House are controlled by the Warden and the Programme Director.

St George's House Trust (Windsor Castle) forms part of the College of St George. In recognition of the large capital sum invested by the House into the buildings it occupies, St George's Chapel continues to provide the premises on a rent free basis and in accordance with a mutually agreed license to occupy. The Chapel also provides a Canon to act as Warden of the House. Should an external appointment be made in future the costs of this would likely be substantially higher. Other than that which has already been noted, St George's House Trust (Windsor Castle) is not materially dependent upon the support of any individual, corporation or class of donors.

Newly appointed Trustees undergo an orientation session to brief them on their legal obligations under charity and company law, the content of the Memorandum and Articles of Association, the Regulations of St George's House, the business plan and recent performance of the company.

The Board is required to meet twice yearly although it is custom to meet more frequently.

The Board is responsible for strategic planning to meet the House's objectives and develop strategy in relation to finance, administration and marketing. The College Finance and General Purposes Committee advises upon investments policy, monitors risk management and prepares business plans and annual budgets. The Programme Director and the Warden allocate Consultation support funds in line with the principles approved by the Board.

The Trustees are satisfied that the accounts comply with current statutory requirements and the Charity's governing documents. Remuneration for key management personnel is determined by the Board on advice from the College Finance and General Purposes Committee. Our aim is to offer competitive salaries which will attract and keep appropriately qualified personnel to manage and deliver the aims and objectives of the Company. The pay of all staff is reviewed annually. Any increases are approved by the Board, taking into account inflation, the financial position of the House at the time and in accordance with average earnings.

OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES

The charitable objectives of the Company as outlined in the Articles are as follows:

"The Objects for which the Company is established are primarily the provision of a residential study centre for those of the clergy or laity who wish to explore the moral, spiritual and practical implications of their various concerns and secondly other religious, educational and other purposes of the Company as the Trustees may from time to time decide."

Pursuant to this the Company runs a residential study centre for clergy of all denominations; it is also a place where people of influence and responsibility in every area of society can come together to debate and discuss issues of national and international importance with the purpose of nurturing wisdom for the betterment of society.

These objectives are met by means of the provision of appropriate Consultations. Such Consultations are designed after taking advice from a range of knowledgeable parties.

The aim of the Consultations is to draw together senior people who might not otherwise have the opportunity to debate key issues with each other. The Consultation format encourages active participation by all present and allows them in an atmosphere of understanding and trust to challenge conventional thinking and to develop new insights. The success or otherwise of a consultation can be measured in two ways. Was the discussion properly constructive? By which is meant did the tailored programme address the topic to hand in a cogent, intellectually robust and inclusive manner? And secondly, did the consultation, where appropriate, produce tangible outcomes? Our intention is that all participants will leave a consultation better educated in the nuances of a particular argument and in a position to bring any newly acquired knowledge or expertise to bear in their working lives.

Care is taken to ensure that Consultations involve a wide cross-section of society and themes. Participants are drawn from a wide range of sectors and every effort is made to reflect diversity in its various forms.

This report, incorporating the Directors' Report, was approved by the Trustees, in their capacity as company directors, on 30/11/2017 and signed on their behalf by:

The Right Reverend DJ Conner, KCVO, Trustee

Signed on behalf of the Board of Trustees

ST GEORGE'S HOUSE TRUST (WINDSOR CASTLE)
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 AUGUST 2017

	Unrestricted Funds General £	Designated £	Restricted funds £	Endowment funds £	2017 Total funds £	2016 Total funds £
Income and endowments from:						
Donations and legacies						
- Associates' subscriptions	23,025	-	-	-	23,025	24,687
- Donations and gifts	339,277	-	-	-	339,277	54,792
Charitable activities						
- Income from course fees (turnover)	733,002	-	-	-	733,002	611,671
- Other incoming resources	58,296	-	-	-	58,296	76,471
Investments	28,194	-	137,124	-	165,318	159,063
Total Income and endowments	1,181,794	-	137,124	-	1,318,918	926,684
Expenditure on:						
Raising funds:						
- Voluntary income	9,221	-	-	-	9,221	161
- investment management	-	-	6,174	-	6,174	6,060
Charitable Activities						
- Course related expenditure	631,635	-	83,217	-	714,852	665,904
- Support and House related expenditure	133,868	5,864	-	46,814	186,546	186,049
- Governance costs	34,828	-	-	-	34,828	42,356
Total expenditure	809,552	5,864	89,391	46,814	951,621	900,530
"Net income / (expenditure) before other recognised gains and losses"	372,242	(5,864)	47,733	(46,814)	367,297	26,154
Net Gains on investment assets	37,255	-	4,038	189,986	231,279	206,195
Net movement in funds	409,497	(5,864)	51,771	143,172	598,576	232,349
Reconciliation of funds:						
Total fund brought forward at 1 September 2016	1,101,669	34,620	442,884	4,423,232	6,002,405	5,770,056
Total funds carried forward at 31 August 2017	1,511,166	28,756	494,655	4,566,404	6,600,981	6,002,405

All of the above results are derived from continuing activities. All gains and losses recognised in the year are included above.

SUMMARY BALANCE SHEET

31 AUGUST 2017

	Unrestricted funds £	2017 Restricted funds £	Endowment funds £	Total funds £	2016 Total funds £
Fixed assets					
Tangible assets	28,762	-	1,137,572	1,166,334	1,222,411
Investments	848,233	73,367	3,428,832	4,350,432	3,919,153
	876,995	73,367	4,566,404	5,516,766	5,141,564
Current assets					
Debtors	69,126	-	-	69,126	101,802
Cash at bank and in hand	853,547	421,288	-	1,274,835	1,105,432
	922,673	421,288	-	1,343,961	1,207,234
Creditors:					
amounts falling due within one year	(259,746)	-	-	(259,746)	(346,393)
Net current assets	662,927	421,288	-	1,084,215	860,841
Total Assets less Current Liabilities	1,539,922	494,655	4,566,404	6,600,981	6,002,405
Net assets	1,539,922	494,655	4,566,404	6,600,981	6,002,405

Capital and reserves

Funds

Endowment funds	-	-	4,566,404	4,566,404	4,423,232
Capital fund	-	-	1,137,572	1,137,572	1,184,386
Director of Studies Fund	-	-	1,754,523	1,754,523	1,657,308
Consultation Support Fund	-	-	1,564,881	1,564,881	1,478,173
Elson Ethics Fund	-	-	109,428	109,428	103,365
Restricted funds	-	494,655	-	494,655	442,884
Annual Lecture	-	53,826	-	53,826	56,563
Elson Ethics Fund	-	8,761	-	8,761	8,607
Director of Studies Fund	-	16,903	-	16,903	19,330
Clergy Bursary Fund	-	4,890	-	4,890	4,890
Consultation Support Fund	-	410,275	-	410,275	353,494
Unrestricted funds - designated	28,756	-	-	28,756	34,620
- general	1,511,166	-	-	1,511,166	1,101,669
	1,539,922	494,655	4,566,404	6,600,981	6,002,405

AUGUST 2017

REPRESENTATIVE KNIGHTS OF THE
MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTER

HRH The Princess Royal, KG, KT, GCVO, QSO

The Right Honourable Lord Carrington, KG, CH, GCMG, MC, PC, DL

His Grace The Duke of Abercorn, KG

Field Marshal The Right Honourable Lord Inge, KG, GCB, PC, DL

Lord King of Lothbury, KG, GBE, FBA

THE DEAN AND CANONS OF WINDSOR

The Right Reverend David Conner, KCVO, The Dean of Windsor

The Reverend Canon Dr Hueston Finlay

The Reverend Canon Martin Poll

The Reverend Canon Dr Mark Powell

OTHER MEMBERS

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THE HOUSE ACKNOWLEDGES THE ASSISTANCE WHICH IT RECEIVES FROM ITS MANY SUPPORTERS AND SPONSORS. In addition to the support of individual associates, the House is grateful for that given by trusts and corporate bodies. Those who have contributed to the work of the House in the past year include:

Sir Mark Moody-Stuart	The Kirby Laing Foundation
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The funds for the Annual Lecture were provided by the Trustees of the Sir Val Duncan and Sir Mark Turner Memorial Trust which was established by Rio Tinto plc in memory of Sir Val Duncan and Sir Mark Turner.

The funds for the Elson Ethics Lecture were provided by Ambassador Edward Elson.

HOUSE ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF AS AT 31 AUGUST 2017

Warden:	The Reverend Canon Dr Hueston Finlay
Programme Director:	Mr Gary McKeone
Society of Leadership Fellows:	Mr Pete Ashby
Directors of Clergy Courses:	The Dean and Canons of Windsor
Warden's Administrator:	Miss Jenna Tyer & Mrs Christine Chamberlain
Programme Administrators:	Mrs Patricia Birdseye, Ms Rebecca Fry & Ms Charlotte Hall
Society of Leadership Fellows Administrator:	Ms Nicola Pryer
Finance Manager:	Ms Fiona McNeile
Catering Manager:	Mrs Catherine Morgan

COMPANIONS & FELLOWS OF ST GEORGE'S HOUSE

Companions:	Mrs Drue Heinz, DBE Mr Eric Hotung, CBE*
Honorary Fellows:	Dr Carolin Engelhorn Sir Claude Hankes, KCVO
Fellows:	Sir David Brown Mr Richard Carden, CB Dr David Coates The Reverend Canon Peter Johnson Mrs Patsy Knight Dr Annette Kramer Rabbi Dr Jonathan Romain, MBE

** Deceased 20 September 2017*



ST GEORGE'S HOUSE

www.stgeorghouse.org

The website provides information on the concept of the House, its background and facilities. Regularly updated, the website includes reports on Consultations, as well as Clergy Consultations and other forthcoming events.

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